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Apology Subverted: The Commodification of
Apology
Lee Taft'
We are living in a time in which extraordinary, public acts of contrition
have become commonplace, so frequent that one pundit describes the
atmosphere that pervades our culture as "apology mania."' As citizens of
the United States we have been witnesses to our President's evolving
apology in the Monica Lewinsky scandal, a tawdry affair that led to his
impeachment in the House of Representatives. The public sphere overflows
with discourse about President Clinton's apologies; his first attempt at
expressed contrition was viewed as woefully inadequate and his later
attempts condemned by many as insincere and politically driven. What a
literature search reveals as a topic previously rarely considered has now
become a national conversation. Against this historic backdrop, I join the
conversation. Here I examine apology and, more particularly, the role of
apology in the context of civil mediation.
Apology is not a stranger to the law. In fact, the role of apology has
been discussed in a growing body of case law,' and there are numerous
legal articles addressing its role in litigation, particularly in the context of
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1. Barbara Amiel, Saying Sorry Is Fine, but Only to a Point, MACLEAN'S. May 25, 1998, at
11.
2. See, e.g., Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 506 n.l 1 (1972) (finding an apology to be a
mitigating factor in the assessment of penalties for contempt); Johnson v. Smith. 890 F. Supp.
726, 729 n.6 (N.D. m. 1995) (viewing an apology as a mitigating factor in the assessment of
punitive damages); Phinney v. Vinson, 605 A.2d 849, 850 (VL 1992) (finding the defendant
doctor's apology to be admissible as an admission against interest but insufficient in itself to
establish breach of standard of care). For a survey of such cases, see Peter H. Rehm & Denise R.
Beatty, Legal Consequences of Apologizing, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL 115, 119-28.
1135
The Yale Law Journal
alternative dispute resolution.3 Indeed, since the time I completed the
original draft of this Essay, two more articles on the topic of apology have
appeared.4 Many commentators focus on apology in utilitarian terms and
promote it as a litigation resource.5 What is missing in the literature is
deeper reflection on apology as a moral activity. In this Essay, I examine
the moral dimension of apology. I argue that when apology is cast into the
legal arena, its fundamental moral character is dramatically, if not
irrevocably, altered.
My interest in this topic stems from my experience as a civil trial
lawyer, a role I filled for more than twenty years before coming to Harvard
Divinity School, first as a student and now as a dean. As an injury
specialist, I represented people who were victims of the negligent and
wanton acts of others, people for whom restoration was limited to monetary
compensation and, less frequently, injunctive relief. Over the years, I
became convinced that something was missing, an essential element the
absence of which disrupted my clients' healing. The payment of large
verdicts or settlement monies failed to heal the deep wounds of many
clients; they continued to suffer and express lingering feelings of anger and
resentment. I began to think that the missing, necessary piece for healing
was an apology from the offender. I thought that this could, and should,
occur as part of the litigation process.
I made this observation firsthand in the early 1980s when I represented
a young widow in a medical negligence case. Her husband had been
seriously injured, and the medical team in charge of his care failed to
discern the extent of the injuries he had sustained. He died a slow and
agonizing death. She was left with small children, few financial resources,
and deep feelings of resentment against the doctors in charge of her
husband's care. The case was eventually settled, and because there were
minor children involved, a hearing was held to apportion the settlement
3. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009
(1999); Stephen B. Goldberg et al., Saying You're Sorry, 3 NEGOTIATION J. 221 (1987): John 0.
Haley, The Implications of Apology, 20 L. & Soc'Y REv. 499 (1986); Aviva Orenstein, Apology
Excepted: Incorporating a Feminist Analysis into Evidence Policy Where You Would Least Expect
It, 28 Sw. U. L. REv. 221 (1999); Rehm & Beatty, supra note 2; Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur
Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in Japan and the United States, 20 L. &
Soc'Y REv. 461 (1986); Deborah L. Levi, Note, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1165, 1183 (1997); Marshall H. Tanick & Teresa J. Ayling, Alternative Dispute Resolution
by Apology: Settlement by Saying "I'm Sorry, " HENNEPIN LAW., July-Aug. 1996, at 22.
4. See Cohen, supra note 3; Orenstein, supra note 3.
5. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 3, at 1013 (arguing in favor of increased utilization of
apology); Orenstein, supra note 3, at 223 (proposing an exception to existing evidentiary rules
admitting apology as hearsay exception); Rehm & Beatty, supra note 2 (arguing in favor of
statutorily constructed safe harbors for apology); Tanick & Ayling, supra note 3 (arguing for
strategic use of apology in mediation); see also STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 159-62 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing the potential for apology to further mediation
efforts).
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proceeds between the widow and the children. As we left the courthouse
after the hearing, she began to rage. I thought she was disappointed in the
apportionment ordered by the court or that she regretted settling rather than
trying the case. But she denied that either of these feelings was the source
of her hostility. She was angry that none of the doctors had ever said he was
sorry that his conduct had contributed to her husband's death. She
experienced this omission as another injury, moral harm added to
professional malpractice. She said that if the doctors had apologized, she
would have felt more able "to heal."
What healing means in a legal arena has not been clearly established. In
medicine, "to heal" is equated with "to cure." In tort litigation, the area of
law from which this Essay is drawn, the law and lawyers tend to equate "to
heal" with "to compensate," an equation that overlooks the idea noted by
legal scholar Margaret Radin that compensation is a "contested concept." 6
Radin distinguishes between commodified concepts of compensation, "in
which harm to persons can be equated with a dollar value," and
noncommodified concepts, "in which harm cannot be equated with
dollars." 7 This distinction is helpful because it shows that while
commodified concepts of compensation may provide financial redress, such
concepts do not necessarily restore moral balance.8 I suggest that it is this
restoration of moral balance that lawyers should intend when they speak of
healing.
This means that healing must be understood in a nuanced way when
considered in a legal context. That is, while a legal client may be physically
injured, he may also be spiritually and psychologically broken. A medical
patient who experiences healing may "feel healed" because of the cure
received, whereas a legal client, like the widow in my illustration, may not
necessarily need or experience healing in a physical sense. Healing for
clients may have a more pronounced moral dimension, a process that can be
facilitated relationally by apology. Apology leads to healing because
through apologetic discourse there is a restoration of moral balance-more
specifically, a restoration of an equality of regard.9 Understood this way,
6. Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Conunensurabilty, 43 DuKE L.J. 56, 56 (1993).
7. Id.
8. See id. at 60-62.
9. The offender demonstrates regard in his willingness to apologize, and the offended reflects
regard when he chooses to forgive. In law this is a process that would often occur between
strangers, so I do not envision that the restoration of regard would necessarily lead to a close
interpersonal relationship. Rather, I envision a process in which the offender and the offended
would each see and embrace the other's humanity and would recognize that each occupies a place
in the wider circle we call life. The process I envision is similar to that described by Desmond
Tutu in his explanation of the African word Ubuntu:
[Ubuntu] speaks about the essence of being human: that my humanity is caught up in
your humanity because we say a person is a person through other persons .... IW)c set
great store by communal peace and harmony. Anything that subverts this harmony is
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apology is valuable because it offers the offender a vehicle for expressing
repentance and the offended an opportunity to forgive. Apology, then, is
potentially healing for both the offended and the offender.
I argue in this Essay that the performance of apology is a complicated
and courageous act, one rich in moral meaning when the apology is
authentically expressed. I argue, too, that in its authentic expression
apology can facilitate forgiveness and the kind of healing my client desired,
the kind of healing I thought should and could occur as part of the litigation
process. Yet it is precisely this extraordinary value of apology that leaves
me less certain of its proper place in the legal arena today. In an exchange
process, apology moves from the realm of moral action into the market
sphere. Questions arise: What if an offended client is philosophically tied to
a belief structure that insists on the expression of remorse as a condition
precedent to forgiveness? Does that not lead to a dangerous dependence on
the wrongdoer? In that scenario, does the performance of apology attain
value without regard to its sincerity? Are proponents of apology
systemically encouraging inauthentic expressions of remorse?
The purpose of this Essay then is to explore the healing possibilities of
apology in law, particularly in the context of civil mediation. I show that
apology can lead to the kind of healing possibilities that I originally
imagined-when the moral dimension is understood and protected. I also
show that while there are some in the legal arena who respect apology as
part of a moral dialectic, many see apology simply as a strategic device to
expedite the resolution of a dispute. I argue against such an instrumental
view of apology, one that would protect the offender from the legal
consequences attached to it. My thesis is that the use in civil mediation of
such a "protected" apology subverts a moral process. This strategic use of
apology may not be necessarily unethical within the narrow confines of
professional responsibility, yet, as I argue here, the subversion of an
otherwise moral process is unethical in the wider realm of human relations.
In order to establish this, I first address some preliminary issues. What
is an apology? What are the elements of an apology? How is apology a
moral act? Are there cultural difficulties that inhibit apology? And are these
exacerbated in the legal arena? For answers to these questions I turn to the
literature available, primarily writings in the disciplines of philosophy,
psychology, religion, and sociology. I then turn to a more focused
discussion of the role of apology in law, identifying some of the
impediments to the moral efficacy of apology in legal, civil-mediated
proceedings. I show how the law itself provides a safeguard for the moral
injurious, not just to the community, but to all of us, and therefore forgiveness is an
absolute necessity for continued human existence.
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Without Forgiveness There Is No Future, Foreword to EXPLORING
FORGIVENESs at xiii, xiii (Robert D. Enright & Joanna North eds., 1998).
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integrity of apology and conclude with suggestions for how lawyers and
mediators can themselves facilitate apologetic discourse in ways that
protect the morality of apology.
I. APOLOGY DEFINED
The characteristic way for human beings to express repentance or
sorrow is through apology. Nicholas Tavuchis, a sociologist who has
written a detailed text on the subject of apology and reconciliation, believes
that "[w]hatever else is said or conveyed, an apology must express
sorrow." , Of course, "sorrow" is subject to a variety of meanings," but in
the context of apology, sorrow is equated with feelings of remorse, shame,
and repentance. This understanding leads Tavuchis to separate the essential
requirements for apology into two critical ingredients: "lIThe offender has
to be sorry and has to say so." 2 According to Tavuchis, the fundamental
pattern for the expression of remorse is dyadic, an interaction between the
offender and offended.'3 That is, the "exclusive, ultimate, and ineluctable
focus" in an apologetic discourse is on the interaction between the offender
and offended, entities that Tavuchis sees as "primordial social
categories." 4
The idea that there exists an "apologetic discourse" suggests a further
important understanding regarding the dynamics of apology: that the
offender's expression of sorrow is a performative utterance.' 5 The sorrow
and regret that the offender has experienced internally is converted by
speech from "a private condition into public communion." ' 6 No longer is
10. NICHOLASTAVUCHIS,MEACULPA36 (1991).
11. For example, the phrase "I'm sorry" can be interpreted as an expression of sympathy as
well as an expression of remorse. See Rehm & Beatty, supra note 2. at 117.
12. TAVuCHIS, supra note 10, at 36.
13. See id. at 46.
14. aI. As I argue later, this idea of the essential aspect of the categories of the offender and
the offended becomes especially significant in the context of civil litigation, where mediators and
lawyers frequently forget this dynamic. See infra Part V.
15. The classic treatment of performative utterances is in J.L. Austin's William James
Lectures at Harvard University in 1955, which are collected in J.L. AUSTIN, How To DO THINGS
WITH WORDS (J.O. Urmson & Marina SbisA eds., 1975). In those lectures, Austin seeks to
challenge the philosophical assumption "that to say something... is simply to stare something."
Id. at 12. To do this Austin contrasts performative utterances against constative utterances. See id.
at 148. A constative utterance is one which can be judged true or false, like "the cat is on the
mat." Id at 146. In other cases, Austin shows that "to say something is to do something, or in
saying something we do something, and even by saying something we do something." IAt at 94.
Austin calls these utterances "performatives." I at 6. A familiar example of a performative
utterance is the utterance "I do" when uttered by the principals in the course of a marriage
ceremony. See id. at 5. Austin likewise describes "I apologize" to be a paradigmatic performative
utterance. See id at 79, 146. In this Essay, I rely on Austin's definition and then examine the
moral dimension of what is said and done through the utterance of the performatives, "I
apologize" or "I am sorry."
16. TAVUCHtS, supra note 10, at 64.
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the offender simply wrestling with internalized humiliation and shame; now
the offender chooses to give voice to these feelings, to allow a public
hearing of the inner conversation. This public expression of repentance
constitutes apology as a performative utterance. 7 And as a speech act, an
apology requires some recognizable steps to make it effective.
To create the foundation for an effective apology the offender must first
take time-before initiating the communication with the offended party-to
"name" the offense, that is, to become clear about the norm that has been
violated and about what it is that calls the offender to apologize. During this
time, the offender is engaged in an internal process in which he comes to
terms with his error, names it, and identifies himself with the action. In this
process, the offender moves to a willingness to admit his wrong and to
express remorse for the result of his act. The offender has heard the call to
repent and has prepared himself to respond. Once the commitment to
respond is sealed, then comes the apology itself.
At a minimum, sociologists and psychologists agree that an apology
must have as its centerpiece "an expression of sorrow and regret." 18 That
is, the primary information to be conveyed in the performance of apology is
sorrow, regret, and remorse.' 9 This is accomplished, according to Tavuchis,
by a precise formula in which the offender acknowledges through speech
the legitimacy of the violated rule, admits fault for its violation, and
expresses genuine remorse and regret for the harm caused by his violation.*'0
Others suggest that at this stage there should also be offers of reparation or
promises to reform.2' Tavuchis rejects these suggestions, maintaining the
idea that an expression of "I'm sorry" necessarily includes such offers and
promises. The remorse and regret conveyed by the words "I'm sorry"
imply a willingness to change, a promise of forbearance, and an implicit
agreement to accept all the consequences, social, legal, and otherwise, that
flow from having committed the wrongful act. Tavuchis worries that to
elaborate the basic formula of apologetic discourse by explicit expression of
these implicit ramifications will disrupt the essential message of the
apology. In short, for Tavuchis there is value in simplicity, value that is lost
if the basic formula he outlines is complicated by explanations and offers of
reparation. Tavuchis's point seems well-taken, especially when we consider
how easy it is for an apology to fail.
17. See AUSIN, supra note 15, at 79; see also JORAM GRAF HABER. FORGIVENESS 100
(1991).
18. TAVUCHIS, supra note 10, at 23; see also Steven J. Scher & John M. Darley. How
Effective Are the Things People Say To Apologize? Effects of the Realization of the Apology
Speech Act, 26 J. PSYCHOLINGUISTIC RES. 127, 130 (1997).
19. See Scher & Darley, supra note 18, at 130.
20. See TAVUCHIS, supra note 10, at 3.
21. See Orenstein, supra note 3, at 239; Scher & Darley, supra note 18, at 138; Wagatsumta &
Rosett, supra note 3, at 469-70.
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Psychiatrist Aaron Lazare paints a detailed portrait of such failure,
which he calls the "botched apology.""- This is the apology that not only
fails to communicate effectively the offender's repentance, remorse, and
regret but creates further harm that can strain relationships or fuel bitter
vengeance.' One example, known to most of us, witnessed by many of us,
is the failed apology of President Richard Nixon:
I regret deeply any injuries that may have been done in the course
of events that have led to this decision [to resign]. I would say only
that if some of my judgments were wrong, and some were wrong,
they were made in what I believed at the time to be in the best
interest of the nation.'
What made this a "botched" apology? Nixon failed to acknowledge his
specific offense, and he failed to identify the norm broken. Further, he
glossed over his wrong by asserting that it was for a greater good.' Senator
Robert Packwood's failed apology eclipsed even Nixon's. After being
accused of sexually harassing at least a dozen women, Packwood said only,
"I'm apologizing for the conduct that it was alleged that I did." 
Lazare suggests that apologies like these fail for psychologically
foreseeable and predictable reasons. The most common explanation for a
failed apology is the offender's pride, which acts as a wall between the
offensive act and the feeling of shame for having violated social norms?'
As Lazare says, "[T]o apologize, you have to acknowledge that you made a
mistake."' This admission collides with values that many take pride in
upholding, ethical values like competency and honesty. Who wants to be
subjected to public exposure for failing to act competently or honestly?
Aversion to such exposure is why apologies are so often expressed in
language like "I am sorry you are hurt" rather than in unequivocal terms
like "What I did was wrong and I see that my wrong actions hurt you. I am
sorry for the injury I have inflicted." It is the egocentric, according to
Lazare, who offers the former "apology." This attempt is destined to fail
because it is offered not to make amends for an injury inflicted, but rather
because the offender regrets "that he is no longer liked by the person he
offended." 29
22. Aaron Lazare, Go Ahead Say You're Sorry, PSYCHOL TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 1995. at 40.40.
23. See id.
24. Id. at 76 (quoting President Nixon's resignation speech of August 8. 1974).
25. See id.
26. Id. (quoting Senator Packwood).
27. See id. at 78.
28. ld.
29. Id Others object not only for the reason suggested by Lazare, but also because the first
attempt shifts the blame for the hurt to the offended party and, in this process, inflicts yet another
offense. See SUSAN JACOBY, WILD JUSTICE: THE EVOLUTION OF REVENGE 347-48 (1983).
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Of course, as Lazare and others note, the greatest impediment to
apology is a pervasive cultural attitude that views apology as a weakness,
an emotional expression antithetical to traditional American values of
autonomy and independence.3" Yet examining the process that leads to
apology reveals that its performance is an act of courage, not an expression
of weakness. Lazare teaches us the difficulty of mustering the
psychological strength to perform apology. In a similar vein, Tavuchis
observes that the offender must conquer fear and gather courage because
the process can be "as painful and devastating as ... any form of physical
retribution.' In the call to apologize, then, the offender sets out on a
course that is difficult, pain-filled, and potentially humiliating, yet also one
of great courage and strength.
We can begin to see how apologies are more than discursive social acts
and how they surpass simple social ritual. In recognizing what is entailed in
an apology, we see the moral quality of the act. Apology is moral because it
acknowledges the existence of right and wrong and confirms that a norm of
right behavior has been broken. It is moral, too, because the person who
apologizes also exposes himself to the consequences of his wrongful act.
When we consider how difficult it is to apologize, the strength and courage
that its performance requires, we see that apology is indeed a heavily
freighted moral action, one moral in its very expression. That is, the
performance of authentic apology is itself a moral act, regardless of its
efficacy. Yet, once performed, an apology sets in motion a call to the
offended, a call for forgiveness.
This suggests that apology is multidimensional in moral terms. It begins
with moral movement on the part of the offender and opens the opportunity
for moral response on the part of the offended. In short, apology does not
exist in isolation; it is, rather, an intensely relational process that cannot be
understood alone any more than a promise could be understood without
30. See Lazare, supra note 22, at 78; Levi, supra note 3, at 1183. Others would suggest that
this is not necessarily an American value, but rather an American male value. See Deborah
Tannen, I'm Sorry, I Won't Apologize, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1996, § 6 (Magazine), at 34. Tanncn
suggests that being male is itself an impediment to apology. See id. Pulitzer Prize-winning
journalist Rick Bragg shares this observation in his recent autobiography. There, he describes the
last time he saw his father, a wreck of a man who had abandoned his sons and his wife to a life of
total poverty:
He talked and talked and never said a word, at least not the words I wanted. He never
said he was sorry. He never said he wished things had turned out different. He never
acted like he did anything wrong. Part of it, I know, was culture. Men did not talk about
their feelings in his hard world. I did not expect, even for a second, that he would bare
his soul. All I wanted was a simple acknowledgment that he was wrong, or at least too
drunk to notice that he left his pretty wife and sons alone again and again, with no food,
no money, no way to get any, short of begging ....
RICK BRAGG, ALL OVER BUT THE SHoUTIN' 12 (1997). For others, this kind of gender
assignment remains only a stereotype and speaks to the importance of further study. See Levi,
supra note 3, at 1184-86.
31. TAVUCHIS, supra note 10, at 35.
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reference to promisor and promisee. Apology becomes "the middle term in
a moral syllogism," a process that begins with an inner urging to repent and
ends with forgiveness as a moral option for the offended.3 2 Apology is, then,
the centerpiece in a moral dialectic between sorrow and forgiveness.3
II. FORGIVENESS
Forgiveness is a topic that cuts across academic lines. Indeed, it crosses
cultures and continents, disciplines and dogmas. It has philosophical and
religious roots, yet today it is a much discussed subject in anthropological,
sociological, political, and psychological circles as well.' What one means
by forgiveness is therefore dependent on a variety of influences such as
one's social, political, cultural, or religious location. I do not intend here to
engage deeply in an interdisciplinary conversation about what forgiveness
is and is not. Defining forgiveness is not the purpose of this Essay. What is
important is to consider how apology acquires value in the process of
forgiveness. This discussion will reveal the moral possibilities an apology
can inspire. Yet it will also show the danger that apology presents in a
litigation context, especially for those who demand expressed contrition as
a condition precedent to forgiveness.
For legal philosopher Jeffrie Murphy, forgiveness, like apology is a
moral activity, part of a ritual in our moral lives.' As a philosopher,
Murphy insists on looking at the purpose of forgiveness and finds there a
moral motivation for forgiving. 36 For Murphy, that motivation is the
overcoming of resentment.37 In tying forgiveness to resentment, he adopts
the prevailing philosophical view that defines forgiveness as the
overcoming of resentment but adds his own requirement that the act of
forgiveness be done only on moral grounds.3
32. Id. at 20.
33. We could pause here and formulate a Kantian critique of this teleological perspective,
which sees apology not as an end in itself, but rather as a means toward obtaining forgiveness. We
could focus on the moral implications of an action taken in order to receive and ask questions that
dissect the legitimacy of an apology performed with that intention. Such an analysis would find
support in modem culture, especially in programs such as 12-step groups. which encourage the
performance of apology without regard to potentially positive possibilities. While I leave this
critique for another essay, I do address apologies deployed for utilitarian means. See infra Part 1II.
34. Indeed, it has been suggested that the topic has given rise to an emerging field of
"forgiveness studies." Scott Heller, Emerging Field of Forgiveness Studies Erplores How We Let
Go of Grudges, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 17, 1998, at A18. Noting that this is not a
phenomenon limited to the United States, Heller cites studies in Northern Ireland. Rwanda, and
South Africa. See id. at A18.
35. See, e.g., Jeffrie G. Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY &
JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIvENEss AND MERCY 14, 28 (1988).
36. See id. at 24.
37. See Jean Hampton, Forgiveness, Resentment and Hatred, in MURPHY & HAMpTON,
supra note 35, at 35, 36 (discussing Murphy's views).
38. See HABER, supra note 17, at 6; Murphy, supra note 35, at 24.
1 1432000]
The Yale Law Journal
Murphy sees meaning in resentment. Indeed, he finds it a valuable and
important stance. He looks past negative attitudes that typically attach to
that term and sees the positive attribute of resentment: that resentment as an
attitude protects the critical value of self-respect. For Murphy, "a person
who does not resent moral injuries done to him.., is almost necessarily...
lacking in self-respect."' 39 Still, Murphy's attachment to resentment does
not lead him to take a stand against forgiveness; rather, he sees value in
forgiveness but insists that it be granted for a morally considered reason."
Murphy insists upon intentionality on the part of the offended party. He
calls upon the actual and critical memory of those injured to recall the
injury inflicted and then to make a conscious choice regarding forgiveness.
His argument cuts against the kind of religious dialogue that insists on
forgiveness as a virtue in and of itself regardless of the magnitude of the
offense or a change in the attitude of the offender. Murphy would argue that
it is hardly a virtue to forgive if in the process of so doing, the forgiver
overlooks or denies his own moral rights. In fact, Murphy would consider
forgiveness granted too quickly and without a moral reason to be a vice.4 '
In Murphy's schema, apology becomes critical to overcoming
resentment, since apology is the spoken performance of the offender's state
of repentance, and Murphy demands contrition as one condition of
forgiveness. Through apology the offender says, "I no longer stand behind
the wrongdoing," thus giving verbal expression to having had a "sincere
change of heart."42 The sincere apology sets the stage in Murphy's scenario
for forgiveness, since the expression of contrition provides a legitimate
moral reason for the offended party to grant forgiveness. For Murphy,
forgiveness without apology would not be a moral act. It would be, as
Susan Jacoby states, "a state of mind-a condition that may be
emotionally... meaningful to the one who forgives but has no significance
as a social bond."43 Jacoby pushes us to see what Murphy means. She
argues that while it is possible to forgive in the absence of an apology, we
should not "if our forgiveness is to be morally respectable.""
What is helpful about Murphy's position is his recognition that apology
plays a crucial role in the process of forgiveness, a process that he sees as
39. See Murphy, supra note 35, at 16.
40. Murphy's reference to Marx is one example of his concern with the premature expression
of forgiveness. Murphy suggests that when Marx leveled his critique of religion as "opiate of the
masses," he must have meant to "suggest that Christianity ha[d] encouraged the development of
meek and forgiving dispositions that will tolerate oppression, and that will call that toleration
virtue." Jeffrie G. Murphy, Introduction to MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 35, at I, 9. Here,
Murphy offers a critique of an inappropriate expression of forgiveness, not a condemnation of the
concept.
41. See Murphy, supra note 35, at 17-18.
42. Id. at 26.
43. JACOBY, supra note 29, at 347.
44. HABER, supra note 17, at 98 (describing Jacoby's views).
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moral. By seeing apology as a legitimate reason to overcome resentment,
Murphy identifies it as an important ingredient in the healing of a moral
injury. This suggests that apology has precisely the value I had originally
imagined: Its authentic expression has moral meaning for both the offender
and the offended as a vehicle for restoring moral balance. Understood this
way, apology facilitates healing and reconciliation as an essential ingredient
in the process of forgiveness. 5
The problem with Murphy's perspective is that it ties the offended
person to the offender. If the offender fails to act in a way that would, for
Murphy, legitimate forgiveness, then the offended party must hold on to an
attitude of resentment to maintain a moral position. This suggests not only a
static moral stance, but also a dangerous dependency, especially for
litigants.' If I believe that you must apologize in order to free me of
resentment, and if I desire to overcome resentment, then your apology
becomes much more valuable to me than to another whose freedom from
resentment is not tied to your apology.47 In the former instance, your
45. For a discussion of my understanding of healing, see supra notes 6-9 and accompanying
text.
46. It also suggests that Murphy is not considering the negative consequences of maintaining
resentment. Psychologist Phillip McGraw notes that there are both physical and emotional costs to
such a stance: "When you harbor hatred, anger, and resentment, your body's chemical balance is
dramatically disrupted. Your 'fight-or-flight' responses stay aroused twenty-four hours a day.
seven days a week. That means that hatred, anger, and resentment are absolutely incompatible
with your peace, joy, and relaxation." PHILLP C. MCGRAW. LIFE STRATEGIES: DOING WHAT
WORKS, DOING WHAT MATrERS 201 (1999).
47. There are two points here. First, apology is potentially more valuable to those who share
Murphy's perspective. While I acknowledge that an apology may have more value to this group. I
believe apology has value even for those whose religious and philosophical location encourages
forgiveness without regard to apology. In short, I think apology is valuable in the process of
forgiveness for all human beings, but I highlight its special value for those, like Murphy, who
insist on apology as a condition precedent to forgiveness. My second point is to identify those
who would argue against Murphy's view that apology is a condition precedent to forgiveness. In
this category would be ethicists like Haber who see that " [t]he wrongdoer need not be involved in
any way for forgiveness to occur." HABER. supra note 17, at 11. From this perspective,
forgiveness is a virtue that can occur unilaterally and internally. This view maintains moral power
in the offended agent, and, consequently, the offended party's moral stance is not tied to that of
the offender. The offended can choose to forgive whether or not the offender chooses to engage in
the performative act of apology.
This is a process a client demonstrated for me several years ago when he chose not to sue a
real estate agent who, although a longtime friend, had forged the client's signature on a contract
and then forwarded the client's check to the title company in a desperate attempt to force a sale.
The client was initially in an understandable state of indignation. We quickly stopped payment on
the check and, with the title company's cooperation, voided the transaction. While the damage
was minimal, the client remained resentful, the agent uncontrite. A year or so later my client heard
the agent was dying in a local hospital. The client reflected on the agent's desperate act, a
reflection that caused him to recall the agent's equally desperate financial situation. My client
decided to forgive. He went to the hospital to talk with the agent, expressed his sorrow that the
friendship had been lost, and expressed forgiveness. My client said there was a warm
conversation, an expression of gratitude by the agent that my client had come, yet the agent did
not apologize. The agent died the next morning.
Under Murphy's view, my client's claim that he had overcome his resentment would not be
morally justified because there was no apology on which the overcoming of resentment could be
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apology becomes potentially marketable, an item to offer in a bargained-for
exchange. In short, an otherwise moral process becomes ripe for
subversion. Not surprisingly, the opportunity to commodify apology has
been noticed and used by lawyers.
Radin observes that " [m]arket rhetoric is the discourse of
commodification." 4 She notes that in systems dominated by market
rhetoric, all human interactions are viewed as market trades and "we
conceive of all things persons value as fungible objects (commodities)."49
Through the pragmatic lens of market rhetoric, all harm to a victim is
measurable in dollars: "IT]he harm is simply a cost to the victim." 5 In this
worldview everything becomes a part of the exchange process, and
everything has a price. Yet, as I argue here, this worldview itself comes
with a price, particularly when it is cast broadly into the realm of human
relations. I borrow from Radin in using the rhetoric of the market in this
Essay to highlight how apology is frequently commodified in the legal
arena, where a moral process can become a market trade.5
III. THE COMMODIFICATION OF APOLOGY
A recent case illustrates my point. Carole Coe, a criminal defense
lawyer in Missouri, was trying a protracted conspiracy case in federal
district court.52 During the course of the trial, Coe was held in contempt
four times, and on the fourth finding was ordered into custody. After she
based. Proponents of unilateral forgiveness would view my client's action as inherently moral
because he chose not to harm himself by maintaining a negative spiritual and psychological state,
and because he chose to embrace the humanity of the agent. By seeing the agent's brokenness, my
client was able to forgive.
While helpful in offering insight into the experience of unilateral forgiveness, this
illustration also suggests that forgiveness is better understood as a process than as a single event.
My client's movement to forgiveness, while unilateral, occurred over a year-long period. It is also
important to note that the damage my client suffered was minimal. Would unilateral forgiveness
have been attained after catastrophic loss? If so, rather than occurring over a year, might the
process have taken a lifetime? Questions such as these reflect my view that forgiveness is a
complicated and difficult process regardless of whether one agrees with Murphy or embraces the
idea of unilateral forgiveness I describe here. My lived experience suggests that, regardless of
one's ethical location, apology can serve as a catalyst to forgiveness, even if only by abbreviating
the temporal dimension my client's narrative suggests. This means that apology has potential
value for anyone who embraces forgiveness as a desirable moral goal.
48. Margaret Jane Radin, On the Domain of Market Rhetoric, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
711, 711 (1992); see supra text accompanying notes 6-8.
49. Radin, supra note 48, at 711.
50. Id. at 724.
51. Of course, it is not only in the legal arena that the moral dimension of apology is
subverted. Children are frequently forced to apologize as a condition of receiving a benefit.
Whenever an apology is forced or used as a part of a bargained-for exchange, its moral dimension
is potentially disrupted. I use the word "potentially" because I recognize that repentance is not
always noninstrumental. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
52. See In re Coe, 903 S.W.2d 916 (Mo. 1995) (en banc).
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apologized, the district judge vacated the contempt decree.53 Coe was later
charged with violations of the Missouri rules of professional conduct, and,
finding her guilty of professional misconduct, the Missouri Supreme Court
suspended her from practice for six months.' Two members of the court
filed opinions "that suggested that if [Coe] would issue a public apology,
they would consider changing their votes to impose only a public
reprimand." 55 Not surprisingly, Coe apologized. True to their word, the
judges changed their votes and Coe was given only a public reprimand.'
Some members of the court observed that Coe's apology failed to meet
the markers of authentic apology outlined in this Essay. One judge noted
that Coe's apology was not prompted by remorse, but rather by the
incentive offered by the court to reduce the penalty imposed: "Given that
incentive, [Coe] apologized. Who wouldn't?" ' The dissent found the
majority's acceptance of Coe's "post-opinion apology" an affront to
precedent, her insincerity compounding "the injury to the process." ' While
they did not use Radin's words, these judges described the process of
commodification, where everything has a price, where a moral process
becomes a market trade.59 Coe helps us see how the moral dimension of
apology is easily lost when it is injected into the legal arena, even when it
occurs under the scrutiny of an en banc court. When apology occurs in civil
mediation, it is even more prone to commodification, more likely to be
subverted. This is because mediation occurs in private settings where the
gesture of apology is encouraged, yet its moral dimension often remains
unexplored. I turn now to the role of apology in mediation. I show how this
moral process is easily subverted into a market trade when cast into this
arena.
Mediation can be defined as "an alternative to adjudication in which a
neutral third party who has no final decisionmaking authority intervenes in
negotiations to assist resolution of conflict." ' In a mediation setting,
parties often have opportunities for interaction that extend beyond those
kinds of communications typically encouraged at the courthouse. As one
legal commentator noted,
53. See id at 917. Here Coe illustrates the point the U.S. Supreme Court made when it noted
that "modification of contempt penalties is common where the contcmnor apologizes or presents
matter in mitigation." Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 506 n. 11 (1972).
54. See Coe, 903 S.W.2d at 920 (Covington, J., dissenting).
55. Id at 919 (Robertson, J., concurring).
56. See id at 918.
57. Il at 919 (Robertson, J., concurring).
58. Id at 921 (Covington, J., dissenting).
59. The financial advantage seems self-evident. What lawyer wants to lose six months of
practice?
60. Levi, supra note 3, at 1169.
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Mediation elicits consent by fostering discussions "of general
moral and interpersonal obligations as well as legal obligations,"
which in turn "activate... [a] sense of responsibility" in the
parties. Mediation's encouragement of forays into moral and
emotional expression sets the stage for gestures like apology, which
register with the apologizee as moral recompense.6
Yet this moral dimension of apology is frequently overlooked by those
facilitating mediated negotiations.
In an essay entitled Alternative Dispute Resolution by Apology:
Settlement by Saying "I'm Sorry," lawyer-mediators Marshall Tanick and
Teresa Ayling argue in favor of apology." From their perspective, apology
is "one of the most effective means of averting or solving legal disputes." 63
They observe that "[p]arties may be reluctant to apologize prior to a final
settlement of a case because of concerns that the apology may be used as an
'admission' in litigation." 64 They suggest that to avoid this technicality the
lawyer must make sure that the apology is "carefully crafted to avoid
admission of wrongdoing." 6
5
Tanick and Ayling later suggest that a good mediator will flush out the
desire for apology early in the proceedings so that the possibility of apology
as a means of resolution can be addressed. After all, an apology "can be an
important element that lubricates settlement discussions." ' After offering
their insights on the timing and typologies of apologies, the authors
conclude with a utilitarian argument in favor of apology: "Lawyers,
litigants, and prospective litigants all should be aware, however, of the
utility of contrition. Apologies should be part of the arsenal of resources
brought to bear in addressing and resolving legal disputes." 67
In their presentation, Tanick and Ayling seem oblivious to the moral
dimension of apology and are apparently unconcerned with the strategic
deployment of this otherwise moral act. By suggesting that an apology be
"crafted to avoid the admission of wrongdoing," they erase a central
element of apology: the admission of wrongdoing. By focusing on efficacy
rather than contrition, Tanick and Ayling distort the moral principle that
61. Id. at 1171 (citations omitted).
62. Tanick & Ayling, supra note 3, at 22-23. I use the term lawyer-mediator to make two
points: Tanick and Ayling are lawyers and mediators, and not all mediators are lawyers.
63. Id. at 22.
64. Id "Admission" as used here is a technical term referring to evidentiary rules that allow
a statement to be introduced into evidence if the statement conveys a message that would
generally be considered to be contrary to one's best interests.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 23.
67. Id at 25.
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energized apology in my earlier discussion. Instead of being perceived as a
moral ritual, apology becomes a material entity, an "object of exchange." 6
In this exchange scenario, apology becomes part of a bargain that
requires two interdependent parties. In this transaction, "[t]he injured party
depends on the offender's taking responsibility for the offensive act, and the
offender depends on the injured party for absolution" for the mediation to
succeed.69 Success here is measured by settlement rather than by moral
restoration. Cast in this way, the apology itself becomes an "exchangeable
good."70 The apology is seen to produce a "happy ending" because each
party saves time and fees.7' From a purely formal standpoint, this exchange
model, in which responsibility is traded for absolution, resembles Murphy's
model in which resentment is traded for forgiveness. But they are not the
same in material expression. Murphy is neither looking for the "happy
ending" nor measuring the value of the interaction in economic terms.
Missing from the exchange model is "the moral climate or sensibility
required for authentic and effective apologetic discourse." ' From a moral
perspective, the bargained-for apology-the strategic object suggested by
Tanick and Ayling-is not an authentic apology. This is because authentic
"apology cannot come about and do its work under conditions where the
primary function of speech is defensive or purely instrumental and where
legalities take precedence over moral imperatives."' Does this mean that
authentic apology cannot take place in a legal arena? Is an apology offered
in the course of litigation always irrevocably tainted, like the apology
before the Missouri court in Coe? Does the law itself contribute to the
corruption of apologetic discourse?
Certainly, evidentiary rules that authorize the admission of apologies as
a declaration against interest can have a chilling effect on the expression of
contrition. That is, fear of legal consequences can operate as an obstacle to
apology. Yet the view that the threat of legal sanction impedes the
expression of apology must be distinguished from the idea that these
evidentiary rules are themselves the cause of the moral corruption of
apology. In the next Part, I focus on this distinction. Then, in Part V, I argue
in favor of traditional evidentiary rules construing apologies as admissions
because such rules are important protectors of the moral dimension of
apologetic discourse.
68. Levi, supra note 3, at 1176.
69. Id
70. Id
71. Id
72. TAVUCHIS, supra note 10, at 62.
73. Id
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IV. THE LAW VIEWED AS AN IMPEDIMENT
From Tanick and Ayling's perspective, the law itself becomes another
impediment to be overcome in apologetic discourse, particularly
evidentiary rules that allow an apology to be construed as an admission for
consideration by a court or jury in a suit by the offended against the
offender. From their vantage point, this evidentiary rule is a hurdle to be
overcome just as were the cultural blocks addressed earlier in this Essay.7"
Tanick and Ayling are not alone in taking this view;" indeed, this
perspective is received sympathetically in today's social and political
climate. I argue, however, that when the legal evidentiary "impediment" of
admission is removed, the moral dimension of apology is entirely eclipsed.
To understand how the law can itself be perceived as an impediment to
moral discourse, one need only recall that, in the United States, law is
founded on the "assumption of individual autonomy and choice, which
implies that the individuals' interests are to be viewed in isolation and often
in competition with those of others." 76 This competition is captured in a
lawsuit, the purpose of which is to establish the fault of one party and offer
relief to the other. This is hardly an atmosphere that encourages expressions
of remorse.77
As I have already shown, an offender who desires to perform apology
authentically must unequivocally express sorrow and accept responsibility
for the violation of a norm. When these requirements are transposed from a
social setting to the legal arena, they are magnified. The fear of admitting to
wrongdoing is intensified when it is made within the litigation culture that
pervades our society. Today, disputes that were once settled privately move
into the public sphere in a way that "shifts the parties' focus away from
private moral concerns to strategic maneuvers and legal consequences." 78
There is a tendency in this movement to place greater weight on winning
than on moral healing, a trend sympathetically embraced by today's culture.
It is a tendency that we in the United States have witnessed with increasing
and disturbing frequency.
President Clinton's conduct in the Lewinsky scandal well illustrates this
tendency. Even as he admitted that he had "sinned," he instructed his
lawyers to take whatever steps were necessary to mount an effective
defense. He has been criticized for what appears to be an inconsistent
position, yet it is a position that some argue is demanded in a litigious
74. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 3, at 1028-30; Orenstein, supra note 3, at 229-36; see also
infra note 94 (examining Cohen and Orenstein's support for such evidentiary rules).
76. Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 3, at 495.
77. See Levi, supra note 3, at 1188.
78. Id.
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culture. From this perspective, he is seen sympathetically, caught in a
systemic vise "between the powers and liabilities of apologies."' From
this perspective, it is understood that he could not be expected to have been
more forthcoming, because "being more apologetic would have further
weakened his position, given our 'argument culture': the current combative
climate that values aggression more highly than conciliation." so
Because of the demands of the law, this argument goes, we are to feel
sorry for Clinton who is now no longer cast as offender but as offended by
a system that first demands contrition and then authorizes use of the
expression of this contrition against him. We are to believe that it is the
system that interrupts another's moral inclination, that interferes with one's
heartfelt desire to express sorrow and accept wrongdoing. Certainly this is
the view of Tanick and Ayling when they suggest that apologies during
mediated proceedings "should be carefully crafted to avoid admission of
wrongdoing." " This view, which perceives the interruption of apologetic
discourse to be the product of a flawed system, has prompted legislators in
at least two states to grapple with the issue by creating "safe harbors" for
the expression of sympathy.
In the 1970s a Massachusetts legislator's daughter was killed while
riding her bicycle. The driver who struck her never apologized. Her father,
a state senator, was angry that the driver had not expressed contrition. He
was told that the driver dared not risk apologizing, because it could have
constituted an admission in the litigation surrounding the girl's death. Upon
his retirement, the senator and his successor presented the legislature with a
bill designed to create a "safe harbor" for would-be apologizors.' This
statute as enacted provides, in part:
Statements, writings or benevolent gestures expressing sympathy or
a general sense of benevolence relating to the pain, suffering or
death of a person involved in an accident and made to such person
or to the family of such person shall be inadmissible as evidence of
an admission of liability in a civil action.'
79. Deborah Tannen, About Last Week... Apologies: iat It Means To Say "Sorry,'"
WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 1998, at Cl.
80. Id. at Cl.
81. Tanick & Ayling, supra note 3. at 22.
82. The legislative history of this bill reveals little substantive information. The bill was
sponsored by State Senator Robert C. Buell and former Senator William L Saltonstall. In a phone
interview with former Senator Buell, I learned that he was asked by former Senator Saltonstall to
sponsor the bill for the reasons outlined in the text. Telephone Interview with Senator Robert C.
Buell (Apr. 25, 1999). Senator Buell did not recall any debate about the moral implications of a
protected apology, and research of the legislative history and media reveals none.
83. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 23D (West Supp. 1998).
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The statute defines "benevolent gestures" as "actions which convey a
sense of compassion or commiseration emanating from humane
impulses."' The Massachusetts statute became the model for a similar
statute recently enacted in Texas,85 which the Austin American-Statesman
dubbed the "I'm sorry" bill.86 Some view statutes such as these as a
movement in the right direction, an important step toward the removal of
systemic impediments to apology.
Included in this group are lawyer-mediators Peter Rehm and Denise
Beatty, who applaud the Massachusetts law because "it provides a safe
harbor for expressing sympathy for accidental injuries."87 So, for example,
"when something bad happens in a health care context," health care
providers can express sympathy for their part in causing "something bad"
without worrying that their words can be used against them.88 According to
Rehm and Beatty, this "serves the public interest because such expressions
have the potential to reduce the number of lawsuits, rather than attract
litigation.,,8' From their perspective, this provides "hope that with an
increased understanding about the legal consequences of apology, more
people will feel safe in tendering an apology." 90
There is, of course, a distinction between an apology as described in
this Essay and the protected expressions of sympathy contemplated by the
Massachusetts and Texas legislatures. Both statutes protect generic words
that express sorrow about another human being's suffering. Neither protects
an authentic apology, understood here as an expression of sorrow coupled
with an unequivocal statement of wrongdoing.9 What is protected are
expressions like "I'm sorry you are suffering" or "I'm sorry for your loss."
What is not protected are statements like "I'm sorry you are suffering
because of my behavior. My conduct was wrong. I regret it, and the pain it
has inflicted." The kinds of expressions protected by statutes such as these
are more akin to botched apologies, apologies that fail precisely because of
their generality.92 While sympathetic expressions may be useful in a fender
bender, they are more likely to exacerbate pain in situations of catastrophic
loss. Consider the widow who was enraged that none of the doctors
84. Id.
85. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 18.061 (West 1999).
86. See Sorry's Safe Now, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, July 2, 1999, at A14.
87. Rehm & Beatty, supra note 2, at 129.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 130.
91. In fact, the Texas statute is explicit in this regard:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsections (a) and (b), a communication, including
an excited utterance as defined by Rule 803(2) of the Texas Rules of Evidence, which
also includes a statement or statements concerning negligence or culpable conduct
pertaining to an accident or event, is admissible to prove liability of the communicator.
TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 18.061 (West 1999).
92. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
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apologized for his part in causing her husband's death. If you were she,
how would you respond if the negligent doctor said only, "I'm sorry you
are suffering" ? Would an expression of sympathy devoid of accountability
help you heal? Would the protected words restore moral balance between
you and the doctor?
It is understandable why legislators would attempt to craft vehicles by
which human relations could be restored, especially since the system itself
is seen as an impediment to the healing possibility of apology. After all,
viewed casually, any step toward the restoration of human relations seems
worthy. Yet these legislative efforts lack any serious reflection on the moral
dimensions of apologetic discourse.93 This oversight has led to the
confusion demonstrated here between authentic apology and the expression
of sympathy. Yet this confusion is not the only harm caused when
legislators fail to consider the moral aspect of apology. When the moral
element of apology is overlooked, statutes like those in Massachusetts and
Texas are viewed favorably because they construct "safe" space for the
performance of apology. But those who favor the creation of "safe
harbors" miss the mark.' In joining the growing chorus who want to blame
93. Recall that the Texas statute authorizes the admissibility of communications concerning
negligence or culpable conduct. See supra note 91. One might therefore conclude that the Texas
legislature considered the moral implications of a protected apology. I interviewed John Fleming,
who had suggested the bill to its sponsor, Representative Patricia Gray. Feining explained that he
had suggested the bill to Representative Gray after learning of the Massachusetts statute. He also
explained that the provision contained in subsection (c) had been added in response to objections
from the plaintiffs' trial association, Texas Trial Lawyers Association, an objection tied to trial
advantage and not moral considerations. He acknowledged that the moral issues posed here had
not been considered. Telephone Interview with John Fleming (Sept. 2. 1999).
94. Orenstein, for example, argues for a rule modification even more expansive than that
provided by either the Massachusetts or Texas statutes. She proposes an absolute exception to
those evidentiary rules that would admit apology into evidence so that - [alny statement of self-
blame and contrition would be inadmissible, as would be the surrounding facts." Orenstein.
supra, note 3, at 247. Under this plan, expressions of contrition or acknowledgments of blame
could never "in themselves be admitted as evidence of negligence or wrongdoing." lId at 248.
Orenstein's proposal would supplant existing evidentiary rules that she likens to "the law of the
sandbox": "Ha, ha, you said it, now you're stuck with your own admission." ld at 249.
According to her, "[Tihough it might be maddening for a defendant ... to deny in court what it
admitted in an apology, the plaintiff on balance is better off ... ." d at 255. Maddening? The
plaintiff in the scenario Orenstein describes is actually in a worse position because of the
protection Orenstein's proposal would extend. Now, instead of suffering only from the original
injury, the plaintiff must suffer exacerbation of that injury by being forced to prove fault in spite
of the defendant's admission. This exacerbation arises not only from the additional expense
required to show fault but also from the additional moral indignation the plaintiff must suffer
because of Orenstein's evidentiary exception.
Cohen agrees with Orenstein that "the law ought to be changed to foster apology." Jonathan
R. Cohen, Nagging Problen" Advising the Client Who Wants To Apologize, DisP. RESOL MAG.,
Spring 1999, at 19. Indeed, he feels that a "goal of the law in this area should be to permit an
offender to make a full and 'safe' apology immediately after the injury or at any time thereafter,
should he so choose." Cohen, supra note 3, at 1061. Cohen states that a strength of such a "safe"
apology is that it gives "the injured party maximal psychological satisfaction at the minimal legal
exposure to the offender." Id. at 1051 n.139. He argues that the "safe" apology uncouples the
issue of apology from the issue of liability. Id. at 1067. Cohen believes that this uncoupling is
2000] 1153
The Yale Law Journal
the system, they fail to see that what they consider systemic impediments to
the performance of apology are actually safeguards of the moral integrity of
the act.
V. THE LAW AS GUARDIAN OF THE MORAL INTEGRITY OF APOLOGY
Apologetic discourse is dyadic, a moral exchange between the
primordial social categories of offender and offended. For an apology to be
authentic, it must meet essential criteria: There must be an unequivocal
expression of sorrow and an admission of wrongdoing. Without a
meaningful and unequivocal expression of wrongdoing, apology cannot be
an authentic moral act. Murphy relies on this authenticity to provide the
moral reason to forgive. Recall, too, that the expression "I'm sorry"
implies a willingness on the part of the performer to accept the
consequences of the wrongful act. It is against this background that
questions arise: Are apologies expressed in the safe harbors constructed by
the Massachusetts and Texas legislatures, and endorsed by commentators,
authentic? Can a protected apology provide a moral reason to overcome
resentment, and thus allow the offended to forgive the offender? For insight
into these questions, I bring my own lived experience, which supports the
intellectual conversion that I underwent in writing this Essay.
Four years ago, my life partner was traveling within the designated
speed limit on a residential street near our home in Dallas, Texas. An
eighty-three-year-old woman failed to stop at a stop sign. She broadsided
his car. In what was later described by witnesses as a spectacular crash, his
jeep rolled over three times, its roof crushed. My partner suffered multiple
injuries, the most serious of which were fractures to his back and a closed-
head injury. Compounding the tragedy was the fact that the elderly woman
maintained minimal automobile insurance, barely adequate to cover my
beneficial because it helps avoid much needless conflict and the adding of insult to injury. It is
clear how this is beneficial to the offender. After all, the offender has an opportunity to unburden
himself with "minimal legal exposure." Yet, like Orenstein, Cohen fails to appreciate how a
"safe" apology potentially exacerbates the plaintiffs injury, how a safe apology can occur at the
offended's expense. If the offender is truly contrite, why not admit liability and allow the case to
proceed on damages alone?
Trials can be bifurcated so that liability can be considered separately from damages. This
means that the admission of wrongdoing can be made while the offender maintains the
opportunity to dispute differing perceptions of the consequences of the wrongful act. Some might
argue that conceding liability while contesting damages is the equivalent of a botched apology. I
disagree. A botched apology overlooks fault; it refuses to accept responsibility. In an admission of
liability, the offender accepts fault and responsibility for the wrongful act. By separating liability
issues from those regarding damages, the offender says only that he disagrees with the
quantitative assessment of the harm caused. In accepting liability, the wrongdoer is "owning up"
to the fact that harm has been caused by a moral transgression, and by trying damages, he asks
help from outsiders in evaluating the cost of that harm. Considered in this way, the "maddening"
effect described by Orenstein is avoided, and the potential for healing for both parties is attained.
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partner's first few days in intensive care. We discovered, however, that she
owned a home that was worth more than a half-million dollars and that was
unencumbered by a mortgage. She was a widow with no children and
shared this home with a nephew. With the help of our lawyer, we developed
a strategy.
We asked that she pay all of my partner's medical bills, lost wages, and
future related medical expenses. We were willing to forgo other legal
damages so that we could recoup our out-of-pocket expenses. To
accomplish this, we asked that she place her home in a trust that would
allow her to remain in it for as long as she lived, but would require that the
house be sold upon her death, and a portion of the proceeds used to
discharge her financial obligation to my partner. She refused. What she did
instead was file an application for bankruptcy, a legal maneuver by which
she sought to discharge any potential liability to my partner while
protecting her home from any claim he might make. Our lawyer filed
objections to this action and, at a later hearing, established that she had
been less than candid in her application. After this hearing, she filed a
voluntary motion to dismiss the bankruptcy. s
It was while I witnessed the bankruptcy proceeding and listened to her
testimony that I first became aware of my resentment toward her. s I
realized that I did not resent her for failing to stop. I resented her for her
unwillingness to accept responsibility for her wrong, and for compounding
the wrong with lies and legal shenanigans. I wonder now, with the voices of
Tavuchis and Murphy playing in my mind, if she had offered an apology
during mediation, and if the apology had been protected as authorized by
the Massachusetts or Texas legislatures, as suggested by Rehm and Beatty
or by Tanick and Ayling, would I have accepted it?' Would an apology
rendered in this context provide a sufficient moral reason to overcome
resentment?" Should I have allowed such an apology to overcome my
resentment?"
95. See In re Cleveland, No. 395-30342-RCM-7 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. May 18, 1995).
96. I am intentionally addressing my own feelings here and choosing to talk about how this
incident affected me. I am not speaking for my partner.
97. This question is, of course, hypothetical. It assumes that the law would grant me legal
rights in my partner's cause of action, such as the right of consortium granted to the non-
physically injured spouse in a heterosexual marriage. No state allows this kind of recovery to
members of same-sex partnerships.
98. I ask the question in this way in order to recall the moral requirements insisted on by
philosophers like Murphy, and also to recall the discussion of unilateral forgiveness, where
forgiveness is imagined without regard to the expressed contrition of the offender. See supra note
47.
99. It is imperative that the reader understand that I speak only of my resentment, since I have
no moral right to exercise vicarious forgiveness. This is a point made clear by both Tavuchis and
Murphy, but perhaps most poignantly by Dostoevsky. In a vignette from The Grand Inquisitor,
Ivan recalls the story of an eight-year-old "serf boy" who threw a stone and injured a dog that
was a favorite of the general who ruled the land. As punishment, the general had the boy
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It is here, where theory meets praxis, that the teachings of Tavuchis and
Murphy speak most loudly. If apology is to be authentic, the offender must
clearly admit his wrongdoing; he must truly repent if the apology is to be
considered a moral act. When an offender says, "I'm sorry," he must be
willing to accept all of the consequences-legal and otherwise-that flow
from his violation. If a person is truly repentant, he will not seek to distance
himself from the consequences that attach to his action; rather, he will
accept them as a part of the performance of a moral act and the authentic
expression of contrition.
If the apology is made at the insistence of a mediator or encouraged by
a lawyer as a strategic choice during a mediated proceeding, the moral
process is potentially corrupted, the moral dialectic challenged., °° At the
very least, it is proper to question the legitimacy of an apology in such a
context. Such an apology occurs in an environment that values and
encourages bargained-for exchange, and such an apology may be prompted
more by a desire to expedite settlement than to respond to a call to repent.
When the apology is shrouded with legal protection, when it cannot be
considered an admission, when no legal consequence can attach to the party
through the apology, apologetic discourse moves from potential to actual
corruption. The moral process of apology in such a protected environment
is now subverted.
This protected apology is the kind that causes me to shudder. It
becomes "merely a pawn or gambit in a power game," full of words but
devoid of meaning.0° This is the kind of apology that should be rejected
"stripped naked" and then forced him to run. See FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE BROTERS
KARAMAZOV 243 (Richard Pevear & Larissa Volokhonsky trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1990) (1880).
The hounds caught him and tore him to pieces before his mother's eyes. Ivan suggests that there
should be no forgiveness, at least no vicarious forgiveness, by the mother on behalf of her dead
child: "Let her forgive him for herself, if she wants to, let her forgive the tormentor her
immeasurable maternal suffering; but she has no right to forgive the suffering of her child who
was torn to pieces .. " Id. at 245.
100. It is important that the reader note the phrase "potentially corrupted." I use this phrase
to hold open the idea that an apology can be prompted by a lawyer or mediator and retain moral
integrity. A call to repent does not have to be purely noninstrumental and uninfluenced by anyone
outside of the offender; that is, the call for repentance may arise externally, lead to apology, and
the apology maintain its moral integrity. In fact, learning to hear the call to repent and to respond
to that call is a part of a maturation process, one that requires attention and care, like the process
by which human beings learn to share and consider others. This means that lawyers and mediators
have the opportunity to contribute, by influence and example, to an essential humanizing process.
A mediator friend told me of an occurrence that beautifully illustrates this point. He was
mediating a case that involved the wrongful death of a teenage child. The mediation was stalled.
The child's father said he wanted to talk with the corporation president in a room with only him.
the president, and the mediator present. This was laboriously arranged. In that session, the father
explained why he thought the president and the company were responsible for his child's death,
how through a father's eyes it appeared to him that his child had been murdered. The corporate
president listened, then acknowledged that he himself had a teenager and, with tears of shame and
remorse, apologized. After that meeting, the parties were able to resolve the case.
101. TAVUCHIS, supra note 10, at 62.
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and discouraged. This is not the time for an offended party to accept such
an "apology"; rather, it is the time for the offended or the offended's
lawyer to maintain focus on the offender's actions, not his words. This is a
time to hold on to one's self-respect, not a time to trade resentment for air.
What becomes apparent from this argument is that it is not the law that
corrupts the moral dimension of apology; it is the disregard of the law's
reason. The law recognizes that an apology, when authentically and freely
made, is an admission; it is an unequivocal statement of wrongdoing. The
law permits such an acknowledgment to enter the legal process as a way to
allow the performer of apology to experience the full consequences of the
wrongful act. An apology made in this context, with full knowledge of the
legal ramifications, is much more freighted than an apology made in a
purely social context. Now the offender must confront not only shame, fear,
and humiliation, but financial risk as well. This calls on the offender to
exercise great courage, one of the markers of a truly moral act.
When lawyers, legislators, judges, and mediators disrupt this process by
viewing apology in utilitarian terms, they subvert the moral potential of
apology in the legal arena. When the performer of apology is protected
from the consequences of the performance through carefully crafted
statements and legislative directives, the moral thrust of apology is lost. The
potential for meaningful healing through apologetic discourse is lost when
the moral component of the syllogistic process in which apology is situated
is erased for strategic reasons." This is why I write: to remind all of those
involved in mediation that apology is a moral process, that moral meaning
attaches to the purpose for which the performative utterance of apology is
employed.
VI. CONCLUSION
I am a proponent of apologetic discourse. Indeed, I have experienced
and witnessed the healing mysteries of this sacred process many times in
my life. I use "sacred" here to call attention to the fact that, from my
perspective, apology and the moral process outlined in this Essay are
embraced by the meanings that word suggests. I like that the breadth of
"sacred" invites the reader to consider both religious and secular
connotations implied in a term that, for some, may mean holy in a religious
sense, and, for others, may mean inviolate, as in inviolate notions of
102. I refer only to the healing opportunities of apologetic discourse. As stated earlier, I
believe that the offended can forgive unilaterally, and thereby heal without regard to the actions of
the offending party. That is, I believe that forgiveness effected unilaterally can restore moral
balance. See supra note 47.
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justice. °3 I believe it is important for those who enter into apologetic
discourse to recall that they have entered into a sacred space.
Of equal importance is that all those who participate in the mediation
process remember that the sacred space entered is of and between offender
and offended. This idea reminds us that "the exclusive, ultimate, and
ineluctable focus" in apologetic discourse is on the interaction between the
offender and the offended."° This suggests that those who seek to facilitate
this interaction must be knowledgeable about the particular philosophical
and psychological attitudes of the offender and the offended. 5 To overlook
these components is to set the stage for the failure of justice.
Consider, for example, the offended party who maintains Murphy's
point of view, that the overcoming of resentment is tied to the offender's
expression of remorse. If the offended party also believes his healing is
dependent on the offender's contrition, and if the offended places a high
value on healing, he may be susceptible to precisely the kind of
manipulation proposed by Tanick and Ayling. This is the kind of client who
might settle in the face of a strategic apology, only later to realize that he
has been victimized again. °6
When I was practicing law, I naYvely thought that apology was the
missing link for my clients, the critical piece necessary for healing. I think
differently now after learning how susceptible apologetic discourse is to
corruption. Still, an apology can be made in a morally meaningful manner
in a mediated environment, in a way that can offer healing for both the
offender and the offended. For instance, an apology made by an offender
103. See 14 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 338-39 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "sacred" as
either holy in a religious sense or inviolate); see also WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE
DICTIONARY 1180 (3d ed. 1996) (same),
104. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
105. As suggested earlier, other cultural constructions, like gender, should be considered. I
would also suggest considering religious attitudes as they affect the moral process outlined in this
Essay. Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism each have particular theological
perspectives regarding forgiveness, points of view that are relevant to this discussion. See Ann
Kathleen Bradley, Seeking Forgiveness in the World's Spiritual Traditions, SPIRITUALITY &
HEALTH, Winter 1999, at 29. In Judaism, for example, forgiveness is not automatic, but must be
earned through the process of t'shuvah (literally "return"), which requires contrition on the part
of the offender. See id. Forgiveness is central to the Christian message and is to be
unconditionally granted. See id. at 29-32. In Islam, as in Judaism, forgiveness is balanced with
justice. See id. at 32-34. Buddhism views forgiveness as a natural result of the realization that we
are all connected, that forgiveness of another is actually forgiveness of ourselves, that what one is
doing to us is something we might have done to another over many lifetimes. See id. at 34-35.
This last idea resonates with concepts of forgiveness in Hinduism, where the idea is that
forgiveness interrupts negative cycles captured in concepts of karma. See id. at 35. This brief
summary suggests how a party's religious location might influence a mediation stance.
106. I am not arguing that a protected apology has no utility or that it can never benefit the
offended. In fact, Senator Buell advised me that, in drafting the Massachusetts bill, Senator
Saltonstall believed that just hearing the words "I'm sorry" could be soothing. See supra note 82.
What I am suggesting is that it is important that the victim understand the significance of a
protected apology before relinquishing important legal rights. This points to the lawyer's role.
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without protection from the legal ramifications that attach to the
acknowledgment of wrongdoing would suggest the kind of authentic
apology that could lead to forgiveness of the offender, the overcoming of
resentment by the offended. Still, the morality of the performance of
apology can only be interpreted within the particular setting in which it is
rendered. From my perspective, this awareness points squarely to the
importance of the lawyer's role in apologetic discourse.
Lawyers need to understand the process of apologetic discourse as
developed in this Essay, particularly the moral dimensions that energize its
authentic expression. Apology can, in fact, occur in mediation in a morally
just way, but as I have said, the setting makes it ripe for subversion, and
apologetic discourse is, therefore, context-dependent. The lawyer must
know the markers of authentic apology, and must be prepared to help the
client understand the nuances of apology as outlined here. This is important
for the plaintiff's lawyer so that his client is not duped into trading his
resentment for the defendant's gain. It is important, too, for the lawyer of
the defendant. If the defendant is contrite and wishes to apologize, he must
understand the legal consequences of expressed contrition. If the defendant
chooses to apologize, a defense lawyer needs to understand the construction
of apology in order to help the defendant avoid a failed apology and the
additional tensions and blocks a failed apology creates. If the defendant is
not contrite and does not feel that he has committed a wrong, a staged
apology would be a moral wrong. 7 Knowledge of apologetic discourse is
important for the mediator as well, so that the mediator can suggest the
appropriate role of apology and provide a formula by which apology can
serve the kind of telos Tavuchis suggests. Knowledge of apologetic
discourse can also help the mediator avoid encouraging a moral subterfuge
by suggesting the utilitarian deployment of apology and, thus, avoid the
kind of unreflective stance demonstrated by mediators like Tanick and
Ayling. What this discussion highlights is that all of those involved in the
mediation process need to be educated about the moral implications of
107. This was apparently President Clinton's position in the Paula Jones debacle. There,
Jones alleged that Clinton had made inappropriate sexual advances in a hotel while he was
Governor of Arkansas. Jones demanded an apology. Later, after the Lewinsky matter surfaced,
Clinton paid $850,000 to settle the matter with Jones but refused to apologize. See Neil A. Lewis,
Clinton Settles Jones Lawsuit with a Check for $850,000. N.Y. TIMES. Jan. 13, 1999. at A14. If
the President was indeed not contrite, this was an appropriate moral choice. Yet, in light of the
progressive apology in the Lewinsky matter, it is difficult to assign moral value to the President's
behavior. After all, Jones was unable to produce the kind of evidence that prompted the apology
by Clinton to Lewinsky and the citizens of the United States. This allows room to wonder whether
the President was actually not contrite or, perhaps, not caught by Jones in the vise created by
Lewinsky's now famous blue dress.
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restorative actions like apology. This insight suggests an important role for
law schools and, more particularly, law-school clinics."0 8
I close with the hope that I have convinced those who are engaged in
mediation that apologetic discourse is an intensely moral discourse, yet
subject to subversion when viewed as a commodity. I hope this Essay leads
those who participate in the mediation process to consider carefully the
purpose of apology. If it is not an authentic response by an offender to a call
to repent, then those who participate in mediation ought not to subvert this
moral ritual for strategic purposes. In those cases, all must be satisfied with
resolution without reconciliation, and trust the offended party to find
healing in another quarter.
I have shown that the law can accommodate authentic apology, and that
this performative act can in fact be fostered in the context of civil
mediation. Authentic apologetic discourse occurs in an environment where
the participants respect apologetic discourse as a moral activity and resist
subverting the discourse for strategic and instrumental purposes. What this
suggests is that there are spaces in law where apologetic discourse can lead
to the kind of healing I originally envisioned for my clients. Yet these
spaces must be understood as interstices within a system that focuses on
rights and duties rather than on restorative acts. After all, the law is a "blunt
instrument," a tool better suited for telling people what to do and how to
behave than how to care for each other.' °9 For this reason, a litigant's quest
for healing must often extend beyond the law into disciplines more
practiced in healing hearts and souls.
108. The idea that law schools should participate in their students' moral education is
controversial. Clinical Professor Mary Jo Eyster thinks this is a crucial responsibility, especially in
the realm of negotiation. See Mary Jo Eyster, Clinical Teaching, Ethical Negotiation and Moral
Judgment, 75 NEB. L. REv. 752 (1996). But see Lee Modjeska, On Teaching Morality to 1tnw
Students, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 71, 71-73 (1991). Professor Modjeska takes the opposite position,
holding that a law classroom is not the place for moral instruction. Modjeska's words reflect the
public's worst perception of lawyers' morality when he states: "Would I represent the accused
murderer, rapist, narcotics dealer? I would-and have. Would their ultimate guilt or innocence be
relevant to me? It would not. Would I represent alleged members of organized crime? I would and
have. Would their nefarious activities be relevant to me? They would not." Id. at 72. Leaving no
room for doubt as to his opinion regarding a lawyer's role in the moral arena, Modjeska
concludes, "Although I would certainly counsel legality, I would not counsel righteousness. I
would not advise them-nor therefore the student-to go and sin no more. Nor would my
professional retainer encompass such a pastoral role." Id. Reflection on Modjeska's words leads
us to see that the controversy is about which morality to teach rather than whether morality should
be taught at all.
109. See Jeremiah Creedon, To Hell and Back: To Break the Cycle of Revenge Countries
Must Look Beyond the Law, UTNE READER, Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 56 (quoting the view of Harvard
law professor Martha Minow).
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